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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
governmental policy,48 it follows that the North Carolina court
would consider the presence of an allotment equally admissible as
evidence in the determination of just compensation.
From the foregoing it would seem that there is no reason why
the North Carolina courts would refuse to allow evidence of the
presence of a commodity allotment to be presented and considered
in the evaluation of condemned land.44
ALGERNON L. BUTLER, JR.
Evidence-Executive Privilege For Aircraft Accident Report
The crash of an Air Force bomber has again brought before
the court a claim of executive privilege for the Air Force Aircraft
Accident Report. The Supreme Court of the United States sus-
tained the privilege in a now famous case, United States v. Reyn-
olds,' on the ground that military secrets were contained in the
accident report. In the instant case, O'Keefe v. Boeing Co.,2 the
privilege was asserted on other grounds.
Plaintiffs, the surviving member of the crew and personal repre-
sentatives of six crew members killed in the accident, instituted an
action for wrongful death and personal injuries against the air-
craft manufacturer in the federal district court on the ground of
diversity of citizenship.3 The complaint in O'Keefe alleged negli-
gence and breach of warranty by Boeing Company. In pretrial pro-
ceedings, plaintiffs moved for discovery and inspection 4 of Air Force
"' [Ain increment added to the value of land by a governmental
policy is not to be deducted from the fair market value of land con-
demned in order to arrive at the amount of the just compensation
which must be paid therefor .... For instance it would obviously
be impossible as a practical matter to deduct from the fair market
value of agricultural land all elements of its value due to the Govern-
ment's agricultural policy.
Iriarte v. United States, 157 F.2d 105, 111 (lst Cir. 1946).
"The principal case is the only case this writer has found that directly
confronts and considers the problem.
- 345 U.S. 1 (1953). Executive privilege was asserted by the Secretary
of Air Force for the accident report of a B-29 crash. Sustaining the
privilege, the Court held that an examination in camera of the report was
unnecessary where the court is satisfied that military secrets are involved.
38 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
'28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1964).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 34. This rule provides in part:
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Accident Reports which were in the hands of Boeing Company.5
The United States moved to intervene6 to assert executive privilege
for the formal accident reports on the ground that "it would be
contrary to the public interest"' to allow discovery since the Air
Force obtains voluntary disclosure of necessary facts only by assur-
ances that the information will be used solely for accident preven-
tion. The district court permitted intervention, but held that there
was no privilege as to records of facts made in the course of the
investigation and contained in the statements of Air Force per-
sonnel, in group reports, and in formal reports.' As to opinions,
speculations, recommendations and discussions of Air Force policy
contained in the accident report, the court sustained the privilege.9
A special master was appointed to examine the accident report in
private and determine which parts were appropriate for privilege in
accordance with the decision. The district court also held that "even
if there were a privilege covering all the papers had they remained
...in the possession of the Air Force," the voluntary release of
them to the defendant waived any privilege once existing as to the
records of facts."°
Executive privilege against disclosure of government informa-
tion is generally recognized for military or diplomatic secrets of
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b),
the court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by
or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to
any of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by
Rule 26(b) and which are in his possession, custody, or control; ....
(Emphasis added.)
Boeing Company admitted possession of accident reports of the accident
in suit and three other B-52 accidents with similarly suspected structural
failure. 38 F.R.D. at 330.
'FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
" 38 F.R.D. at 334.
' Group reports are essentially a number of component reports prepared
by members of separate investigation teams which examine particular aspects
of the aircraft and its operations. The formal report contains the findings,
recommendations, speculations and conclusions of the investigation board.
Affidavit and Claim of Privilege for Secretary of the Air Force, pp. 6, 10-11,
O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
' Good cause as required by FED. R. Civ. P. 34 for discovery was found
for records of facts, but the court held there was no sufficient showing of
good cause for the remainder of the accident report. 38 F.R.D. at 336.10 38 F.R.D. at 335.
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state," informers, 12 and interagency communications."3 Privilege is
also granted to various governmental reports designated confidential
by statute.1 4 The term "privileged" as used in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is said to refer to privileges as understood in the
law of evidence.' A less clearly defined privilege is that based upon
"public interest."' It is upon this ground that the Secretary of the
11*g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Totten v- United
States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); In re Grove, 180 Fed. 62 (3d Cir. 1910);
United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (No. 14692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807);
Republic of China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551 (D.
Md. 1956). See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2378 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
2 E.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (criminal prosecu-
tion); United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. Minn. 1949) (civil
action) ; see 40 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 45 (1941), where it is stated:
A disclosure of the sources would embarrass informants-some-
times in their employment, sometimes in their social relations, and in
extreme cases might even endanger their lives. We regard the keep-
ing of faith with confidential informants as an indispensable condition
of future efficiency.
Id. at 46-47. See generally 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton
rev. 1961).i 3E.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1960); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 38,
157 F. Supp. 939 (1958); cf. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 25
F.R.D. 485 (D.N.J. 1960).
"
4E.g., 13 U.S.C. § 8 (1964) (census information); 35 U.S.C. § 122
(1964) (confidential status of patent application); see Tansey v. Trans-
continental & W. Air, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 458, 461 (D.D.C. 1949) (CAB
aircraft accident report). See generally Carrow, Governmental Nondis-
closure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 188-91 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Carrow]. Prior to an amendment in 1958, federal
agencies frequently relied upon the "housekeeping statute," 72 Stat. 547
(1958), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964), to prevent disclosure to litigants. The
amendment specifically provides that the section does not authorize the with-
holding of information from the public. See 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
26.25(4) (2d ed. 1963). The United States in O'Keefe denied an asser-
tion by plaintiffs that it was relying upon the "housekeeping statute." Reply
Memorandum of the United States, pp. 5-6. But in United States v. Reyn-
olds, the Government did rely on this statute to assert privilege for the Air
Force Accident Report. 345 U.S. at 3-4.
'r E.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953); Mitchell v.
Roma, 265 F.2d 633, 636 (3d Cir. 1959); 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFr, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 651, at 94 (Wright ed. 1961).
"0 See Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 994 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd
on other grounds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor
Co., 4 F.R.D. 265, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.
v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 38, 157 F. Supp. 939 (1958). See generally
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2378, at 805-07 (McNaughton rev. 1961)); Car-
row; Hardin, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J.
879 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Hardin]. Professor McCormick suggests
that the "public interest" test might be acceptable to United States courts
as long as the judge is responsible for the balancing of the public and the
private interests involved. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 303-04 (1954). The En-
1966]
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Air Force asserted privilege for the accident report in O'Keefe. In
this uncertain area, a careful balancing must take place between
competing interests: that of the individual's right to fair procedure
and a just result, as opposed to the government's desire for less
than full disclosure to facilitate effective administration consonant
with the public interest."
Immediately following an accident involving Air Force aircraft,
a board of officers is convened to investigate, determine the cause or
probable cause, recommend action to prevent recurrence, and pre-
pare the formal Aircraft Accident Report." Air Force policy' 9 in
regard to the investigation and accident report is directly related to
its flight safety program.20  Departmental regulations specifically
outline the purpose and procedure of the investigation to insure re-
stricted use of the accident report for accident prevention.2 ' The
Air Force is convinced that full, free and frank disclosure of the
circumstances surrounding the accident can be obtained only by as-
glish decisions seem to support the broad basis of privilege to official infor-
mation by granting it whenever disclosure would be injurious to public
interest, and accept the executive's determination as conclusive if made by
the proper officer in the proper form. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co.,
[1942] 1 All E.R. 587 (C.A.).
"'See generally Carrow; Hardin; Lundy, Executive Privilege and
the Air Force, JAG BULL., Nov. 1959, p. 13; Timbers & Cohen, Demands
of Litigants for Government Information, 18 U. PITT. L. REv. 687 (1957).
" Air Force Regulation 127-4 [hereinafter cited as AFR] (investigating
and reporting USAF accidents/incidents). See generally AIR FORCE MAN-
UAL 127-1 [hereinafter cited as AFM]; Feretti, Aviation Accident Investi-
gations under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, JAG J., Sept. 1959, p. 13;
Prince, Litigation Problems in Aircraft Accident Reports, JAG BULL, Jan.
1961, p. 22 [hereinafter cited as Prince].
"v United States Army and Navy policies in regard to aircraft accident
investigations and reports are essentially identical. OPNAV Instruction
3750.6D (Navy regulations); Army Regulations 95-30, 385-40. See Burch,
Reporting Facts for the Navy Aviation Safety Progran, JAG J., Sept.
1959, p. 5 [hereinafter cited as Burch]; Munns, The Privileged Status of
the AAR, JAG J., Sept. 1959, p. 9 [hereinafter cited as Munns].
20 AFR 127-4 1-2; AFM 127-1 58-59, 63(c). "The sole purpose
of the investigation is to determine all factors relating to the accident/inci-
dent and in the interest of accident prevention, to preclude recurrence."
AFR 127-4 16(c) (1) (assurance to witness).
2 1AFR 127-4. "Reports and investigations of USAF accidents and inci-
dents made under this regulation will be used only within the USAF to
determine alt factors contributing to the mishap for the sole purpose of
taking corrective action in the interest of accident prevention . . . ." AFR
127-4 23(a) (1) (Emphasis added). "Unless specifically authorized by the
Chief of Staff, USAF, the distribution of aircraft . . . accident/incident
reports . . . will be limited to commanders and authorities specified in this
regulation." AFR 127-4 24(a).
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surances of confidence, 2 and therefore, the release of its accident
report would significantly impair its flight safety program.23
If assurances of confidentiality were not given, the factual in-
formation would not be wholly objective and opinions as to the'
cause would not be disinterested. Were witnesses or investi-
gators to fear any form of liability as to themselves or their em-
ployees on account of information furnished or developed, there
would be much reluctance on their part to be completely free
and frank in their disclosures and investigations. Unless it gave
such assurances, therefore, the Air Force would be unable to
make a reasonable determination of the factors causing an air-
craft accident.2
Thus, a privilege from disclosure is claimed. In an effort
to protect this privilege asserted for the Aircraft Accident Re-
port, the Air Force established a collateral board which conducts
its own investigation of the aircraft accident and makes a separate
report which may be obtained by parties in a law suit.' The col-
" See 38 F.R.D. at 334. The Secretary of the Air Force stated in his
Affidavit and Claim of Privilege:
This trend of reduced accident rates is not a barren statistical
phenomenon but is, on the contrary, a direct result of accident preven-
tion activities on the part of the Air Force. Reports of Aircraft
Accident Investigation Boards are a central and highly important
part of the flight safety program of the United States Air Force ....
Affidavit and Claim of Privilege for Secretary of the Air Force, p. 5,
O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Plaintiffs in
O'Keefe disputed this argument, and after comparing the declining accident
rate in the airline industry with the military reduction, they concluded that
the:
passenger fatality rates and aircraft accident rates have been reduced
because of greater aircraft and component reliability, increased em-
phasis on pilot skills, increased aviation education for pilots and crew
members, improved maintenance procedures, improved aviation safety
in general, etc.
Supplemental Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Intervene for Plaintiffs,
p. 10, O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
23 38 F.R.D. at 334. See Burch.
" Affidavit and Claim of Privilege for Secretary -of the Air Force, p. 4,
O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The Secretary
also correlated the efficiency of the flight safety program to the maintenance
of national security by stating: "It is essential to the national security that
the strength of the United States Air Force not be diluted by accidents in
which its aircraft are destroyed and its flight crews killed or maimed. The
national security, therefore, requires constant vigil and vigorous activity in
fostering an effective aircraft accident prevention program." Id. at 3.
" AFR 110-14. See generally AFM 127-1 88; Lundy; Prince; Tolen,
Collateral Investigations, JAG BULL., May 1960, p. 34; Zbar, Collateral In-
vestigations, JAG BULL., July-Aug. 1963, p. 3. The Navy conducts a supple-
ment investigation for the same purpose. See generally Burch; Krouse,
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lateral investigation is not mandatory on all accidents and is criti-
cized for being less thorough than the accident report.2
The accident report has been a subject of litigation in a series of
cases since military aviation came of age. Whereas the "good cause"
requirement of Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
has been used to oppose discovery of the accident report on several
occasions, 7 the most serious difficulties have occurred when execu-
tive privilege is asserted. In two of the earlier cases, 28 the court
required the defendant military service to produce the accident re-
ports for in camera inspection by the judge for his determination of
the validity of the defendant's claim of privilege. In neither case was
the privilege sustained. The Air Force again claimed privilege for
its accident report in Reynolds v. United States.9 Judge Mars,
speaking for the Court of Appeals, rejected the claim of privilege
based upon "the prevention of accidents and the optimum promotion
of flying safety in the Air Force."
3 0
Moreover we regard the recognition of such a sweeping privi-
lege against any disclosure of the internal operations of the execu-
tive departments of the Government as contrary to a sound public
policy. The present cases themselves indicate the breadth of the
claim of immunity from disclosure which one government depart-
ment head has already made. It is but a small step to assert a
privilege against any disclosure of records merely because they
might prove embarrassing to government officers. Indeed it re-
quires no great flight of imagination to realize that if the govern-
Naval Supplement Investigation vs. The Aircraft Accident Report, JAG J.,
Sept. 1959, p. 5; Munns.
2 See 2 KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW 292-96 (1963).
"
7E.g., United States Lines, Inc. v. United States, 186 F. Supp
824 (D. Del. 1960) (totality of circumstances surrounding aircraft
collision warrants finding of good cause); Eastern Air Lines, Inc., v.
United States, 110 F. Supp. 491 (D. Del. 1952) (good cause shown); Evans
v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255 (W.D. La. 1950) (good cause shown since
the plaintiff had no other source from which the information could be had);
Reynolds v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950), rev'd on other
grounds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), where the court found good cause was shown
for production of the accident report in light of the nature of the accident,
difficulty of obtaining information as to the cause thereof, lapse of time
and the fact that surviving witnesses were still in military service. See
generally Byron, The Production and Admissibility of Government Records
in Federal Tort Clahs Cases, 20 MD. L. REv. 117, 119 (1960); Prince.
"' Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255, 257 (W.D. La. 1950); Cres-
mer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
2o 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 1
(1953).
20 Id. at 993-94.
[Vol. 45
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ment's contentions in these cases were affirmed the privilege
against disclosure might gradually be enlarged by executive de-
terminations until, as is the case in some nations today, it em-
braced the whole range of governmental activities.31
The government was ordered to produce the accident report in
order that the court might determine whether it contained privileged
matter. Upon noncompliance by the government, the court entered
an order82 that the facts on the issue of negligence be taken as
established in plaintiff's favor.
On appeal to the Supreme Court the order for production of the
accident report was reversed.3 3 Privilege was granted on the basis
of military secrets involved in the accident. The Court held that
the privilege will be sustained without examination if the court is
satisfied from all the evidence and circumstances that the documents
contain military secrets that should not be disclosed in the interest
of national security. 4 The validity of the claim of executive privi-
lege based on the other grounds asserted was not decided, the Court
implying in a footnote that such a privilege might exist. 5 The de-
cision also established a standard of necessity to determine in each
case "how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the
occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate. ' 36
In In re Zuckert3 7 the plaintiffs instituted collateral proceedings
1Id. at 995.
'
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(i).
"United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
"Id. at 10. But see Snyder v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y.
1956) (dictum), where a district court in 1956 denied a motion for dis-
covery of the accident report on the basis of the work product rule, but
added:
[I]f an adversary party in a pending action properly requests the
information and the Government declines to respond because of alleged
military secrecy, then it is obligated to submit the information or
records to the court for its determination as to whether the claim of
privilege is well founded.
Id. at 9.
"345 U.S. at 6, n.9.
"Id. at 11. The Court stated:
Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege
should not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity
cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satis-
fied that military secrets are at stake. A fortiori, where necessity is
dubious, a formal claim of privilege, made under the circumstances of
this case, will have to prevail.
Ibid. For a criticism of this necessity standard, see Asbill & Snell, Scope
of Discovery Against the United States, 7 VAND. L. REv. 582, 600-02 (1954).
'28 F.R.D. 29 (D.D.C. 1961), aff'd in part, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
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in the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Air Force
for production of the accident report. -A claim of privilege was
asserted on the ground that disclosure would jeopardize the future
success of the Air Force's flight safety program. There was no
claim that military secrets were involved. The district court sus-
tained the privilege. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia affirmed in part, holding in Machin v.
Zuckert 8 that portions of the accident report containing testimony
of private parties are privileged when the government is not a party
to the suit and disclosure would harm the Air Force flight safety
program. The court gave partial relief by ordering production of
portions of the accident report containing factual findings of the
Air Force mechanics. Subsequently, the Secretary offered limited
disclosure of the mechanics' report to plaintiffs, construing "factual
findings" of the mechanics rather narrowly. In a supplemental opin-
ion," Judge Washington ordered the Air Force to produce the
mechanics report in its entirety for the district court on remand for
examination in camera to determine what portions were privileged.
Judge Washington did not feel that the Secretary's offer constituted
adequate compliance.
There can be no question as to the vital role that the flight safety
program plays in the military service, nor that the accident investi-
gation is a primary contributor to its success. The confidential
nature of certain testimony acquired by the board can and should
be protected. If this portion of the testimony would be unavailable
to the investigator without an assurance of confidence, it would have
been unavailable to the plaintiff ab initio. ° But this reasoning does
not support the granting of privilege to the accident report in its
entirety. Substantial portions of the accident report, including testi-
mony of many private parties, are available to the board in a quite
unconfidential manner, for example, various eyewitnesses' testimony,
and technical reports such as the mechanics' report in Machin.4
316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. deined, 375 U.S. 896 (1963); 49 VA.
L. REv. 1025.
316 F.2d at 341 (filed Mar. 9, 1963).
,o The writer served on two Air Force Aircraft Accident Investigation
Boards in 1962. The assurances of confidence often have a noticeable effect
on otherwise hesitant witnesses. Unfortunately, these witnesses are usually
essential.
,316 F.2d at 340. The court reasoned:
From our review of the case, however, it appears to us that certain
portions of the report could be revealed without in any way jeopardiz-
[Vol. 45
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There are good reasons not to sustain the claim of privilege for
the accident report in its entirety withbut 'requiring an in camera
inspection of the documents by the court. Applying the Supreme
Court "necessity" test as established in United States v. Reynolds,'
victims of a typical military aviation accident make a strong prima
facie showing. Jurisdiction over the scene of the accident and the
investigation lies in the military; only authorized personnel are per-
mitted in the vicinity. The investigation and disposal of the wreck-
age is expedited. Much of the evidence is destroyed upon impact
and frequently there are no knowledgeable survivors. The best wit-
nesses are often technically-trained military personnel who are not
inclined to fix responsibility upon their employer. The victims lack
the technical and financial resources available to the government to
duplicate the military investigation. Furthermore, it is not uncom-
mon for the victim or his next of kin to be unaware of a legal
remedy until months or years after the accident. As to the validity
of the claim of privilege to be weighed against the showing of
necessity, how is the court to determine this validity without knowl-
edge of the accident report's contents? There exists a reasonable
apprehension, as voiced by the Third Circuit in Reynolds v. United
States,4" of unchecked executive power to claim privilege for rea-
sons not legitimate or appropriate.
The court in O'Kecfe appears to have expanded the scope of
documents in the accident report not privileged from the prior
limited discovery allowed in Machin. The distinction made in
O'Keefe between records of facts and those of opinions, specula-
tions, etc., as to whether privilege should apply is not unreasonable
so long as the court accepts responsibility, as the O'Keefe court did,
for making this determination by its own examination. It is signifi-
cant that O'Keefe could have been decided solely on the basis of a
waiver of privilege. 4 Instead, the court took care to specify which
ing the future success of Air Force accident investigations. We refer
to the factual findings of Air Force mechanics who examined the
wreckage. Their investigations and reports would not be inhibited
by knowledge that their conclusions might be made available for use
in future litigation, and their findings may well be of utmost rele-
vance to the litigation now pending between appellant and United
Aircraft.
Ibid.
42 345 U.S. at 7. See note 36 supra.
,3 192 F.2d at 995; see note 31 supra and accompanying text.
"Discussion with Air Force officials indicates that they accept the
1966]
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portions of the accident report were not privileged. In light of the
waiver involved, the O'Keefe decision cannot be taken as conclusive
on the issue of privilege. But it is a step forward and perhaps the
next court to face the same issue will clarify any uncertainty.
Accepting the premise that certain portions of the accident report
should be privileged, there is no reason to believe that the court by
in camera examination cannot protect the varied interests by using
as its determinative standard the public interest in: (1) making
available to all parties in a law suit the information necessary to
guarantee a just result, and (2) protecting the confidential nature
of certain testimony which would otherwise be unavailable in flight
safety investigations.
GERALD M. MAYO
Future rnterests-Contingent Class Gifts-Implied
Conditions of Survivorship
In a class gift of a future interest, should a requirement be
implied that only members surviving the preceding estate share the
remainder estate when the only condition precedent attached to their
interest is unrelated to survival? In Lawson v. Lawson1 the court
implied such a requirement on the contingent interest. Testator
devised a life estate to his daughter and, at her death, to her chil-
dren and, if she had no children, then to her whole brothers and
sisters. The daughter survived testator and died without children
or descendants of children. Four brothers and sisters survived the
daughter, and two brothers survived the testator but predeceased the
daughter. The court held the alternative remainder interests of the
class to be contingent due to the condition precedent that the life
tenant die without children. Without distinguishing contingencies
based on survivorship and on unrelated conditions precedent, it per-
mitted only class members surviving the life tenant to share the
remainder interest. Exclusion of descendants of predeceased broth-
ers implied a requirement of survivorship to distribution where the
only express condition was unrelated to survival.
That a remainder is contingent should not be a sufficient basis
O'Keefe decision as based on waiver, whereas plaintiffs' counsel contend
that the court made it quite clear as to which portions of the accident report
privilege is appropriate.
1267 N.C. 643, 148 S.E.2d 546 (1966).
[Vol. 45
